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Post 9/11, understanding how people become terrorists has come to be discussed in terms 
of “radicalisation”. Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic 
process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a 
political or religious cause. Without doubt, the issue of radicalisation has become a core 
fixture of contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. Yet, clearly, terrorism 
has an extraordinarily long history and what is called radicalisation today, in the past was 
referred to do much more mundanely as “becoming” a terrorist, “joining” a terrorist group, 
or of being “recruited”.1 No one talked of the IRA being radicalised, or Shining Path, or Black 
September or the Red Brigades. Though all of these older groups certainly were by our 
modern understanding.  
 
Ultimately, the emergence of the term “radicalisation” to describe this process of deepening 
involvement in radical violent causes and activism, is a very recent phenomenon. It 
effectively began in the aftermath of 9/11, when a shift started to move away from talking 
about people “becoming” terrorists, “joining” terrorist groups, or being “recruited”. As an 
alternative, the term “radicalisation” first started to appear in documents discussing how 
people became involved with terrorist causes or movements in 2002, but by 2007 it had 
effectively taken over policy and research discourse on this subject. Exactly what 
“radicalisation” meant, however, was open to some interpretation.2 Compared to the 
previous terminology, it was certainly a more exotic term which presumably described a 
more exotic process. 
1 This paper has been published as: Silke, A. and Brown, K. (2016). ‘‘Radicalisation’: The Transformation of 
Modern Understanding of Terrorist Origins, Psychology and Motivation.’ In Shashi Jayakumar (Ed.), State, 
Society, and National Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century, pp.129-150. Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing. 
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 It did not help that, like terrorism itself, radicalisation as a term arrived already mired with 
some political baggage, and was quickly shackled with even more, all of which has hindered, 
rather than helped its scientific development. One of the most straightforward of the recent 
scientific definitions of radicalisation, for example, comes from Horgan and Braddock, who 
defined it as: “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced 
commitment to extremist political or religious ideology”.3 Taken at face value, such a 
perspective offers plenty of scope to develop our understanding, but as Peter Neumann 
highlighted, the politicisation of the term created a multitude of obstacles: 
 
Unfortunately the concept of radicalisation, as used in many government-linked 
quarters, suffers from politicisation, is fuzzy, applied one-sidedly (only non-state 
actors are assumed to radicalise, not governments), often lacks a clear benchmark 
(adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law, abstaining from the use of 
violence for political ends), and is linked too readily with terrorism (broadly defined) 
as outcome. Its broader application to political activism of individuals and 
movements in societies where social development is blocked by non-democratic 
extremist regimes is problematical.4  
 
Terrorism as a term has also been mired with similar difficulties in how it has been defined, 
though this has not restricted the enormous growth in terrorism studies in recent years, or 
research on a bewildering range of topics linked to the area.5 Similarly, the development of 
theoretical models and research on radicalisation has been enormous in recent years, and 
the focus of this chapter is to attempt to review some of the major developments in our 
understanding of radicalisation and the significant issues connected to the phenomenon.  
 
 
Theoretical Models of Radicalisation 
 
The past decade has been an exceptionally vibrant period for the development of models of 
radicalisation.6 New research has fuelled a plethora of theories around what factors and 
processes drive radicalisation, and provided a range of sometimes very different 
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perspectives on the issue. There is not enough space in this chapter to review all of these 
models, but we can focus attention on some of the major ones, bearing in mind that it is 
likely that new models will continue to emerge and many of the current ones will be refined 
further. 
Moghaddam’s Staircase Model of Radicalisation 
 
Fathali Moghaddam’s staircase model was one of the first detailed models and since its 
publication in 2005 it has become one of the most influential of the theoretical models.7 In a 
recent review it was identified as among the 100 most cited articles on terrorism.8 The 
model presents radicalisation as a phased process, involving six stages in total. Figure 1 
provides an outline of the model.   
 
Figure 1: Moghaddam’s Staircase Model of Radicalisation 
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GROUND FLOOR 
Psychological Interpretation of Material 
Conditions 
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There are six stages in total and each stage is represented by a different step in the 
staircase.  The higher you progress in the model, the fewer the number of people who reach 
each level, and the step metaphor is designed to reflect that progress through the different 
phases is not automatic or inevitable. The ground level of the model starts with perceptions 
of discontent and a desire by individuals to improve their situation. If they are unsuccessful 
in doing this, feelings of frustration and anger develop towards any entity individuals believe 
are responsible for these setbacks. Moral disengagement from standard social norms occurs 
as the individual increasingly begins to adopt the moral framework of the terrorist group or 
cause. This deepens as the individual progresses up the staircase, to the point where in the 
final stage they are incorporated within the terrorist movement and are willing to carry out 
acts of violence on behalf of the cause.  
 
 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12 mechanism model 
 
Published in 2008, the McCauley and Moskalenko model argues that radicalisation can 
happen at three different levels: individual, group and mass.9 Within this framework, each 
level might best be considered as comprising a set of different pathways leading to 
radicalisation, and 12 different mechanisms as to how this can happen are described. Table 
1 below outlines the model and the mechanisms.  
 
At the level of the individual, radicalisation is caused primarily by grievances, either 
experienced directly or else experienced by the group the individual identifies with. Group 
and mass radicalisation can be the result of competition and conflict with other groups or 
states. With the model, radicalisation is defined as a “change in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in 
defense of the ingroup.”10 
 
 
4 
 
 Table 1: McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12 mechanism model 
 
Level of radicalization                Mechanism 
  
Individual 1. Personal victimization 
 2. Political grievance 
 3. Joining a radical group—the slippery slope 
 4. Joining a radical group—the power of love 
 5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups 
Group      6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 
 7. Competition for the same base of support 
 8. Competition with state power—condensation 
 9. Within-group competition—fissioning 
Mass 10. Jujitsu politics 
 11. Hate 
12. Martyrdom 
 
 
 
Importantly the model stresses the reactive nature of radicalisation. For ten out of the 
twelve mechanisms, radicalisation is occurring in response to events and forces in the 
environment, and particularly to threats to the individual and to the group. The model 
overall stresses the importance of environmental context in understanding how and why 
radicalisation happens. A further important element is that ideology is not a key causal 
factor of radicalisation in this model. Indeed, in the original article describing the model, 
ideology is not mentioned at all. It does receive attention in later accounts, but overall 
within this framework, ideology is not the key driving force. As McCauley and Moskalenko 
noted in 2010, radicalisation can occur without an ideology:  
 
“there are many paths to radicalisation that do not involve ideology. Some join a 
radical group for thrills and status, some for love, some for connection and 
comradeship.  Personal and group grievances can move individuals toward violence, 
with ideology serving only to rationalise the violence.”11 
 
A final noteworthy element of the model is McCauley and Moskalenko’s conclusion that 
“Radicalization emerges in a relationship of intergroup competition and conflict in which 
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both sides are radicalized” [emphasis added]. Thus, it is not just terrorists who are 
radicalised, but also those who are fighting against them. Radicalisation, then, is not a 
process that only produces terrorists, but rather affects all sides in violent conflicts.  
 
 
Kruglanski et al.’s Quest for Significance Model of Radicalisation  
 
A more recent model on radicalisation has been offered by Kruglanski et al., and this looks 
as if it will become a quite influential theory.12 The model effectively emerged from research 
studies exploring the role of significance quest in terrorist motivation. Studies in the area 
suggest that the move towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with 
perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own 
self-esteem and sense of significance.13 How the model works is outlined in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Kruglanski et al.’s Quest for Significance Model of Radicalisation 
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Unlike McCauley and Moskalenko’s model, ideology plays a much more central role in this 
framework. For Kruglanski et al. there are three major elements in the radicalisation 
process: (1) an individual motivation for personal significance (often a reaction to perceived 
failures, threats and setbacks in life); (2) an ideology which identifies appropriate ways to 
achieve personal significance; and then (3) social processes which bring the individual into 
contact with this ideology.   
 
There is empirical support for some elements of the model. For example, a loss or drop in 
personal significance is likely to cause a “collectivistic shift” in an individual’s sense of 
identity.14 This effectively means that the individual’s identity shifts towards a more group-
based identity, with greater priority and meaning given to the group’s norms and values. 
Studies suggest that this is further linked with both a greater willingness to sacrifice and to 
support violence on behalf of the group and its values.15   
 
 
Key Factors Associated With the Radicalisation Process 
 
While there may be considerable variation in emphases, inevitably the various models of 
radicalisation also have significant overlaps. Where there is general agreement between 
them is usually around the view that radicalisation is a complex and dynamic process which 
results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or 
religious cause. The process is not inevitable nor does it follow a single route. Instead, most 
of the models highlight that there are multiple pathways to violent extremism and that the 
process of getting there can often be an often erratic experience capable of going in a 
variety of directions. 
 
As even the brief review of theoretical models in the previous section illustrates, there is no 
single root cause of radicalisation. Indeed, more than 200 different factors have been 
identified by research which could play a role in the radicalisation process.16 Not all of these 
factors feature in every case, and there is often very considerable variation. Ultimately, 
radicalisation is not simply the sum of different factors, but rather that the different factors 
seem to play a role at different stages in the process.17 Key events can motivate individuals 
7 
 
to radicalise further or to de-radicalise, and overall radicalisation is best seen as a complex, 
non-linear and dynamic process.    
 
The general trend in research findings though is that radicalisation is the result of the 
interaction of both personal factors (e.g. individual susceptibility) and environmental factors 
(e.g. social relationships, community attitudes).18 Studies have also highlighted that static 
and dynamic factors both play significant roles in radicalisation. Static elements include, for 
example, demographic factors such that young people aged 15-24 are most at risk, and 
males are usually more affected than females.19 Dynamic factors can include social 
relationships, which in most cases are probably one of key elements in the radicalisation 
process. Camaraderie, social support and a sense of belonging can all be powerful incentives 
for becoming and staying involved with a radical group.20  
 
In his analysis of the life histories of hundreds of jihadi terrorists, Edwin Bakker for example 
found that these individuals tended to become involved in terrorism through networks of 
friends or relatives and that generally there were no formal ties with terrorist networks.21 
More recent research suggests that in up to 20% of cases family members played a key role 
in introducing and initiating to an extremist movement. In contrast, friends played the key 
role in almost 50% of cases.22 
 
Psychological vulnerability can also play a significant role, though this should not be 
confused with mental illness or serious psychological problems, which overall are present in 
relatively few cases of serious radicalisation.23  The presence of an extremist ideology is a 
further factor, though the key element here is probably around how an individual latches 
onto the ideology and incorporates elements of it within their own identity. The 
transformation of the individual’s identity is an important dimension, rather than, for 
example, nuances within the ideology. Indeed, radicalised individuals can often have a 
surprisingly simplistic and shallow understanding of the ideology.24 
 
In the following section we will explore in more detail a selection of these different factors 
which have been linked with the radicalisation process. 
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 Psychological Vulnerability to Radicalisation 
 
The issue of psychological vulnerability to radicalisation has attracted growing attention, 
though there is variation in how this is interpreted and assessed.25 A range of psychological 
factors have been identified as important to radicalisation including: issues of grievance, 
perceived injustice, identity, anger, revenge and a quest for significance. Certainly, most 
extremists believe at the time of their offending that their actions are morally justified, and 
various psychological processes (such as deindividuation, mortality salience, moral 
disengagement and risky shift) appear to play an important role in facilitating their 
involvement.26  We can now consider some of these issues in more detail. 
 
 
Quest for Significance 
 
Quest for significance has already been discussed in relation to Kruglanski et al.’s model of 
radicalisation.27  One of the key findings in this regard is that perceived success in life 
appears to be a factor in radicalisation. Individuals who perceive themselves as less 
successful identify more with their religion or nationality. Kruglanski et al. explained this in 
terms of a collectivistic shift. Of concern here are studies that show that people who see 
their identity primarily in these terms are more likely to express support for extremist 
violence. Other research shows that feelings of shame or insignificance correlate with 
support for extremism and political violence. 28 Linked to this, recent research in the UK has 
found that Muslim individuals with symptoms of mild depression were more likely to 
express support for terrorism and political protest.29  
 
Thus, the gravitation towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with 
perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own 
self-esteem and sense of significance.  
 
 
Identity 
9 
 
 How someone sees their identity appears to be an important factor.30 People who see their 
identity as individuals first, are less likely to support or feel positive about an extremist 
ideology. In contrast, people who have a collectivistic identity (i.e. they see their identity 
first in terms of their religion or nation) are more supportive of extremist violence. Past life 
events can play an important role in an individual’s sense of identity. Studies show that 
there is a strong relationship between self-reported life failure (or lack of success), and 
greater identiﬁcation as a member of a collective (nation or religion). Those who experience 
a loss of signiﬁcance are more likely to then adopt collective ideologies that will provide 
them with signiﬁcance. Once someone has adopted a group-centred identity, studies show 
they are more likely to engage in activity in support of that group.  
 
 
Self-Esteem 
 
Linked with the quest for significance, many theories have assumed that individuals with 
lower levels of self-esteem can be more vulnerable to radicalisation. 31 In this framework, 
the extremist ideology can offer people a way to enhance their self-esteem. Recent research 
results, however, suggest a more complex picture with self-esteem effects. Low self-esteem 
is associated with increased vulnerability to radicalisation, but so too, is high self-esteem.  
Found that individuals with moderate levels of self-esteem seemed to be the most resilient 
to violent radicalisation.32 
 
Added to this, is the related finding from other research studies that people at early stages 
of radicalisation can show low self-esteem, but individuals at later stages (who have been 
heavily radicalised) actually report high self-esteem (a result of embracing the ideology and 
the message that the individual is an active member of a valued in-group).33  
 
 
Mortality Salience 
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When people are exposed to death-related thoughts or imagery this results in what 
psychologists refer to as a ‘mortality salience’ effect. Psychological research has shown that 
even very subtle cues relating to death can create mortality salience effect – even when the 
cues are not consciously recognised by the person involved.34  
 
Mortality salience has a number of psychological effects. After exposure to such images 
people will usually feel an increasing pride in and identification with their country, religion, 
gender, race, etc. They experience exaggerated tendencies to stereotype and reject those 
who are different from themselves. The group you belong to is even better than it was 
before, even more worthy of your support. Your rivals though are diminished, less deserving 
of sympathy or compassion. People feel greater hostility toward those who are perceived as 
different others or as a threat.  
 
These changes in attitude and perceptions are also linked to changes in behaviour. Some of 
these are relatively subtle, such as sitting closer to a person who shares your own culture, 
while moving further away from foreigners. Others are starker, including increased physical 
aggression toward anyone critical of cherished beliefs.  
 
Crucially, mortality salience has also been found to lead to an increase in support for 
extremism when it is linked to group identity. For example, one study found that under 
mortality salience conditions white Americans expressed more sympathy and support for 
other Whites who expressed racist views. In the Middle East, researchers found that Muslim 
students under mortality salience conditions expressed more support and sympathy for 
suicide bombers, and also expressed a greater willingness to carry out suicide attacks 
themselves.35 
 
The more that important cultural icons and beliefs (e.g. in the context of militant jihadi 
terrorism, reference to the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed, and other vital aspects of 
Islam) are involved, then the more pronounced that the effect is likely to be. Mortality 
salience leads to an increased attachment and protectiveness towards such beliefs and also 
produces increased hostility and aggression to others who appear to be denigrating or 
insulting such icons and beliefs.  
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Altruism and Self-Sacrifice 
 
Perhaps strangely, many people see their involvement with an extremist movement as a 
pro-social activity, and altruism has been identified as a potential factor in radicalisation.36 
Altruistic tendencies can be increased by stressing similarities with others. The stronger a 
person can identify with others the more they care about what happens to them. In 
contrast, stressing the differences weakens such bonds and interest and concern declines.  
 
Altruism is likely to have an impact on support for extremism when it is considered within 
the context of identity. Individuals who feel their identity is closer to the militant group, and 
who score higher on altruistic measures, are arguably the ones who will express and feel the 
strongest support for the group including the group’s use of extreme measures. Potentially, 
they will also be more likely to act on these sentiments.   
 
Importantly, studies show that measures of altruism correlate closely with measures of the 
psychological willingness to self-sacrifice.37 Both of these factors also match closely 
measures of having a commitment to higher causes - causes which provide meaning in 
people’s lives. Self-sacrifice is also linked to an increased willingness to engage in extreme 
actions, to endure personal suffering and hardship on behalf of a cause, and feeling angry 
towards people who do not respect that cause.  
 
 
Radicalisation and Children and Teenagers 
 
Many individuals can become engaged with violent extremist movements at very young age 
and adolescence, in particular, seems to be a critical period. Why adolescence is so 
important appears to relate to issues around identity and negative emotions. Establishing a 
clear sense of identity is a normal part of adolescence. The concern with radicalisation is 
when identity gravitates towards an ideology-based violence and is shaped by this.  
 
12 
 
This is more likely to happen in cases where the young person has a strong identification 
with an (ethnic and religious) in-group; where they perceive this in-group as superior; yet, 
where they also perceive that this in-group has been humiliated by others.38 The 
psychological background can be marked by negative emotions and a quest for significance. 
Self-esteem may be low at the start of the process, but can rise as the individual embrace’s 
the radical ideology and incorporates this more and more into their own sense of identity.  
 
Young people with high personal uncertainty (e.g. who experience higher levels of anxiety 
and confusion) can be more inclined to support ideology-based violence. Researchers argue 
that uncertainty is a distressing feeling, and that people are fundamentally motivated to 
achieve a sense of certainty about themselves and their social worth. This can make 
extremist ideologies which provide a clear “black and white” worldview that minimizes 
ambiguity and uncertainty very attractive, and indeed, studies show that people gravitate 
towards radical beliefs when they experience high levels of uncertainty. Also, young people 
who have a higher sense of agency (i.e. feel that they understand themselves and their 
roles) appear more willing to actually act on violent intentions. Important background 
environmental factors which contribute to all this, can be negative situations at home, the 
presence and endorsement of the ideology among their peers and family, and negative key 
events in their personal lives.39   
 
 
Gender and Radicalization 
 
Recent research shows that the recruitment of young men and women to terrorist causes 
can be highly gendered and operates on two levels.40 How this happens can be well 
illustrated by examining recent developments with regard to militant jihadist radicalization, 
particularly with regard to Islamic State (IS). At the first level, recruitment focuses on 
critiquing gendered globalized societal patterns and norms, and second, targeting individual 
lives. These two layers of propaganda and recruitment reinforce each other, and provide a 
broad alignment of public values with private aspirations. 
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The first globalized narratives are produced on a mass scale and distributed via a range of 
media and platforms, from ask.fm, Instagram, Facebook, and twitter, to online video 
channels and dedicated websites. Klaussen’s in-depth analysis of IS online material reveals 
that less than 10% of material is concerned with violence.41  Although different communities 
are targeted in unique ways there are common trends. Generally, the material focuses on 
the failings of western states to allow Muslims to live according to their faith, points to the 
violence of Western governments and state agencies against Muslims, and emphasizes the 
faults of Muslims who adopt alternative understandings of an Islamic way of life and - 
particularly targeting Shia and Sufis. These claims are highly gendered and declare it an 
obligation on Muslim men to defend ‘rightly believing’ women from such attacks.  
Reinforcing this perception of threat, they allege that European men are emasculated by 
European state agencies, and are not ‘real men’ because of their failures to defend the 
‘appropriate’ gender order. For example, the French language magazine, Dar Al-Islam, which 
supports ISIS, in the edition entitled “Qu’Allah Maudisse La France”, argued that: 
 
"the laws banning the hijab, [and] the anti-terrorist laws which allow the 
imprisonment of any Muslim without any serious evidence are all slapping the face 
of every Muslim who still believes that it is possible to live with the disbelievers or 
worse to live Islam under the authority of the disbelievers …” 
 
They highlight perceived discrimination in stop and searches by police that appear to 
disproportionately target Asian/Muslim men, as well as different sentencing and 
prosecution outcomes for Muslims compared to Caucasians.42 Female supporters of ISIS talk 
about ‘jihadi-hotties’, or ‘hipster jihadis’, that fighters are more manly, and therefore better 
Muslims, and  more attractive than Western Muslim men.43 Correspondingly, they contend 
that women in the west are not respected, and the roles of wife and mother are not 
valued44. They present Islamic State as an opportunity for young men to demonstrate their 
‘manhood’, by becoming a fighter/hero, by supporting and defending women, and by 
following God’s requirement that they live under Islamic law. Avatars of ISIS men and their 
online personas emphasize their commitment to fitness, to guns, and to having sufficient 
income to provide for a family as the primary breadwinner. Fatherhood is also emphasized; 
for example, there is an online video from ISIS made in summer of 2015 showing men 
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playing with children in a well-equipped playground, and fathers training young boys in 
combat and shooting45. The young boys are called ‘Little cubs’’ or ‘little bears’.46  
 
Correspondingly, they ask women to demonstrate their commitment to God and Islamic law 
by being a ‘support’ to their (future/current) husbands in Islamic State and by bringing up 
the next generation of Muslims in the ‘correct’ manner.47 Women are told to expect a 
‘protected’ but ‘purposeful’ life in Iraq and Syria under ISIS, and are encouraged to think 
about life as part of the ‘sisterhood’, facilitating belonging and commitment to the new 
cause. The interview with the girlfriend of one of the Charlie Hebdo attackers emphasized 
the need for women to be the ‘base’ and ‘rocks’ for men in ISIS.48 Online material uses 
particular gendered motifs to exalt individual behaviours and traits. For women, modesty, 
piety and complementarity with men is emphasized through images of a lion and lioness, or 
a ‘green bird’; images of romantic love do emerge, but these are presented as the 
‘beginning’ of a new life rather than an end in itself. Notions of ‘purity’ therefore become 
important - purity meaning of femininity/masculinity tied to morality and of faith. 
 
 
The Online Environment and Social Media 
 
The past decade has seen enormous attention focused on questions around the role that 
the online environment and social media play in radicalization.49 While the online 
environment is hugely diverse and public platforms are used for propagating messages, 
recruitment of members (rather than merely sympathizers) requires more personalized 
forms of communication. They often use closed forum and messaging platforms, such as 
Telegram and WhatsApp. Islamic state ‘groups’ is increasingly suspicious of unsolicited 
requests, and some reports suggest they require a ‘recommendation’ from a 
‘known’/‘trusted’ individual.  This became evident in the Channel 4 Dispatches programmes 
aired in November 2015, where the undercover reporter had considerable difficulty 
accessing groups that ‘met in real life’ and she was finally ousted from a meeting because 
she couldn’t allay the lead woman’s fears that she wasn’t carrying a camera in her bag50. 
Closest links seem to be with siblings51. Recruiters exploit their extensive knowledge of an 
individual by targeting any existing vulnerabilities in the young person’s identity and life 
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experiences. Peer-to-Peer recruiters also encourage young women to distrust friends and 
family or ‘traditional’ authority figures, arguing ‘they don’t understand’. Moreover they 
argue that those in the West follow an Islam that has been ‘perverted’ by culture and 
traditions that are not Islamic, or that those in authority have become corrupted by working 
for European authorities. This process of isolating young people from those around them 
and generating thick bonds of trust between them is essential to convincing them to make 
the move from belief to action (moving to IS territories). NGOs working in de-radicalisation 
anticipate spikes in recruitment during summer holidays, winter and Easter breaks.52 This is 
because the intensity and volume of interaction is higher, as young people have fewer 
‘distractions’, but also because travel is less suspect. Further, we see a spike in travel over 
the summer as young women seek to avoid ‘holidays’ to Pakistan or India. There are reports 
of some young couples where families have denied their union as travelling to Islamic State 
together during this time. 
 
They target individual lives in specific recruitment, and offer ‘hope’ through direct material 
reward, status and privilege53. Additionally they tap into disappointment with life in the 
West; women’s experiences, opinions and lives are shown ‘not to matter’ to the ‘outside 
world’ (whether that is Western politicians, state agencies or Muslim communities) and 
recruiters point to the failure of others to take potential recruits actions or words seriously. 
At the individual level, they appear to focus on the lack of control and voice young women 
have in their lives - whether in the home, the community or at school. They then link these 
personal experiences of disappointment back to a worldwide phenomenon of victimisation 
and oppression, for their global narrative that Muslims can’t live side by side with non-
Muslims.  
 
They offer a ‘new life’ belonging to IS young women, in which are given ‘choices’ (Islamic 
State allege) regarding marriage, work, and education - providing they abide by the strict 
rules of gender segregation. Recruiters emphasise how ‘meaningful’ life is, and that 
hardships (in terms of electrical or medical shortages) are the burden they must endure in 
order to become better Muslims. Importantly young women are presented with illusion of 
‘choice’ in future husbands, providing their ‘wali’ (guardian) approves of the match. In 
marrying a fighter, women are given status and prestige, something recruiters allege they 
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will not get while living in the West.54 Furthermore Western women are ‘prized’ potential 
wives (over local women) because they have shown their commitment to the cause by 
undertaking the journey, and because they have higher levels of education, and maybe 
linguistically closer to their future husbands. The material is replete with decontextualised 
verses from the Quran and the Hadith (stories of the Prophet Mohammed’s life). They aim 
to show how men can emulate the life of the prophet if they live in their Caliphate.  
 
However in contrast to carrying out these domestic roles in the UK, in Islamic State it is 
alleged women can unite their private faith and life with their public/political goals. Islamic 
State make it clear they do not anticipate women contributing to the ‘battlefield’, rather 
they are to provide supporting and domestic roles but this is a ‘political choice’ as much as a 
personal one.55 Images of women with weapons or dressed as a suicide bomber are signaled 
as a sign of defence but also to signify their support of violent ‘jihad’ and to show off the 
capability and weaponry available to fighters of Islamic state. Women are ‘trained’ in the 
use of light weaponry but only to defend themselves or their children, or to serve in two 
female-only moral police forces in IS territory – such as the Al-Khansaa Brigade56.   
 
As the discussions show, the material offers a utopian vision57 of itself - it identifies a 
problem with the world and living in the West, it presents an awe-inspiring and grand 
solution (itself), argues that young Muslims are responsible for its realization, and offers 
‘hope’ for a future. There is an underlying tension with this approach where it emphasises a 
new ‘good life’ for potential recruits while simultaneously highlighting their belief in an 
imminent apocalypse. However this does not render IS a ‘death cult’: rather, death and 
violence is for a purpose - the protection of the new proto-state, and its ‘citizens’. They link 
these global narratives of masculinity, politics and femininity to ideas about individuals’ 
behaviours, by bridging the individual, or private world, with public global narratives. Islamic 
State has been more successful in that than other groups. 
 
 
Conclusions 
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Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has 
transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time 
that ‘radicalisation’ took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around 
terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Yet, is it a case that the major 
breakthroughs in understanding have happened because ‘radicalisation’ is a genuinely 
useful concept that has facilitated this progress? Or is it simply the inevitable result of the 
massive amount of research which has been focused on terrorism and terrorists in the wake 
of 9/11?  
 
While radicalisation as a concept has troublesome baggage, it has nevertheless worked as 
an overarching theme for research on questions looking at support for and involvement in 
violent extremism. In this regard, it has arguably proven both more flexible and more 
cohesive than the previous frameworks. It has almost certainly made it easier to connect 
together disparate research findings across a range of academic disciplines. Combined then 
with the huge and sustained increase in scientific research across the area, significant 
progress seems almost inevitable.  
 
Yet, while progress has been made, there are still very significant gaps in our understanding. 
Much of the evidence base remains seriously weak. Good quality studies have trickled in, 
but more are still needed. At this stage, it is clearly critical to remember that radicalisation is 
the result of many factors, some of which are about the individual involved, and some of 
which relate to their environment (including family and community). The range of factors 
involved is extensive, and the result is that radicalisation processes are complex and varied. 
Radicalisation itself is not a fixed state, but is dynamic, and changing events and factors can 
either deepen radicalisation or bring about de-radicalisation. 
 
We also need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of 
radicalisation. A subtle assumption has spread that ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon is the 
major root cause of terrorism. Yet, it is surely more accurate to see radicalisation as the 
recruitment processes. Other causes drive these processes, and it is these causes which 
merit attention and intervention. Added to this, many models of radicalisation seem weakly 
linked to the evidence we have regarding the structural causes of terrorism.58 When 
18 
 
different models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and 
programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay 
attention to the causes identified within that model as key factors. Failing to do that, risks 
leading counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism down false roads.  
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